The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

49 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2014

See all articles by William Kerr

William Kerr

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit

William Fabius Lincoln

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance

Prachi Mishra

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 24, 2014

Abstract

How is economic policy made? In this paper we study a key determinant of the answer to the question: lobbying by firms. Estimating a binary choice model of firm behavior, we find significant evidence for the idea that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying. The existence of these costs is further confirmed in studying how firms responded to a particular policy change: the expiration of legislation relating to the H-1B visa. Due to its influence on firm behavior, we argue that this persistence fundamentally changes the environment in which legislation is made.

Keywords: lobbying, political economy, immigration, H-1B

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D78, F22, F23, J61, O31, O38

Suggested Citation

Kerr, William R. and Lincoln, William Fabius and Mishra, Prachi, The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying (February 24, 2014). William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 1072, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2400545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400545

William R. Kerr (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

William Fabius Lincoln

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )

500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States

Prachi Mishra

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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