Payout Policy

119 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2014 Last revised: 19 Nov 2016

Joan Farre-Mensa

Northeastern University, D'Amore-McKim School of Business

Roni Michaely

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI)

Martin C. Schmalz

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; CEPR; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 24, 2014

Abstract

We survey the literature on payout policy, with a particular emphasis on developments in the last two decades. Of the traditional motives of why firms pay out (agency, signaling, and taxes), the cross-sectional empirical evidence is most persuasive in favor of agency considerations. Studies centered on the May 2003 dividend tax cut confirm that differences in the taxation of dividends and capital gains have only a second-order impact on setting payout policy. None of the three traditional explanations can account for secular changes in how payouts are made over the last 30 years, during which repurchases have replaced dividends as the prime vehicle for corporate payouts. Other payout motives such as changes in compensation practices and management incentives are better able to explain the observed variation in payout patterns over time than the traditional motives. The most recent evidence suggests that further insights can be gained from viewing payout decisions as an integral part of a firm’s larger financial ecosystem, with important implications for financing, investment, and risk management.

Keywords: Payout Policy; Survey; Dividends; Share Repurchases

JEL Classification: G35

Suggested Citation

Farre-Mensa, Joan and Michaely, Roni and Schmalz, Martin C., Payout Policy (February 24, 2014). Ross School of Business Paper No. 1227. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2400618 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400618

Joan Farre-Mensa (Contact Author)

Northeastern University, D'Amore-McKim School of Business ( email )

Boston, MA 02115
United States

Roni Michaely

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, 1211
Switzerland

Martin C. Schmalz

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan St
R5456
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
7347630304 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/martincschmalz/

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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