Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations

42 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2014 Last revised: 4 Dec 2018

See all articles by Jean-Etienne de Bettignies

Jean-Etienne de Bettignies

Queen's University - Smith School of Business

Jan Zabojnik

Queen's University - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 2, 2018

Abstract

We study an organization, consisting of a manager and a worker, whose success depends on its ability to estimate a payoff-relevant but unknown parameter. If the manager has private information about this parameter, she has an incentive to conceal it from the worker in order to motivate him to search for additional information. If she could commit to an information-sharing policy, the manager would share her information more than under no commitment, though less than would be efficient. Further results on the effects of managerial ability, and on the interaction between managerial and worker abilities, are also derived.

Keywords: Information Non-Disclosure, Expert Evaluation, Agency Costs, Time-Inconsistency Problem

JEL Classification: D21, D82, L23

Suggested Citation

de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne and Zabojnik, Jan, Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations (December 2, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2400853 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400853

Jean-Etienne De Bettignies (Contact Author)

Queen's University - Smith School of Business ( email )

Smith School of Business - Queen's University
143 Union Street
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

Jan Zabojnik

Queen's University - Department of Economics ( email )

94 University Avenue
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada
613-533-2275 (Phone)
613-533-6668 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/faculty/zabojnik/Page/

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