Umbrella Effects and the Ubiquity of Damage Resulting from Competition Law Violations

Maier-Rigaud, Frank (2014) Umbrella Effects and the Ubiquity of Damage Resulting from Competition Law Violations, Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, 5(4), 247-251.

9 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2014 Last revised: 16 Jul 2015

See all articles by Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods; NERA Economic Consulting

Date Written: February 25, 2014

Abstract

This paper discusses the ubiquity of damage resulting from competition law violations. Umbrella pricing is considered but one instance of quantifiable damage of potentially substantial magnitude occurring outside the vertical chain typically considered the relevant locus of damage resulting from competition law infringements. One of the reasons for this restrictive approach are the general tort principles of causality and foreseeability. This article suggests that, if interpreted too narrowly, the use of these principles as claims regulators is threatening the very policy goal of full compensation for any individual harmed. A wider interpretation of these general tort principles is proposed that would allow claims to be regulated by the merits of the evidence presented. This would render private enforcement in line with the more economic approach followed in the public enforcement of competition law.

Keywords: umbrella effects, umbrella pricing, KONE, AG Kokott, damages claims, economic harm, causality, foreseeability, damage

JEL Classification: K21, K40, L40

Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P., Umbrella Effects and the Ubiquity of Damage Resulting from Competition Law Violations (February 25, 2014). Maier-Rigaud, Frank (2014) Umbrella Effects and the Ubiquity of Damage Resulting from Competition Law Violations, Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, 5(4), 247-251.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2400946

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Contact Author)

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

NERA Economic Consulting ( email )

1166 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
United States

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