From the Great Lakes to the Great Rift Valley: Does Strategic Economic Policy Explain the 2009 Malawi Election?

31 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2018

See all articles by Samuel Rueckert Brazys

Samuel Rueckert Brazys

University College Dublin (UCD) - School of Politics and International Relations

Peter Heaney

Independent

Patrick Paul Walsh

UCD; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Date Written: February 26, 2014

Abstract

Ethno-regional voting cleavages have featured in a number of sub-Saharan African states during the third wave of democratization following the end of the Cold War. While the causes and consequences of these cleavages are well studied, there have been surprisingly few attempts to understand how strategies of pan-ethnic or pan-regional coalition building based on distributive economic policies could be employed to secure national electoral coalitions. In this paper we examine if in the 2009 Malawian parliamentary elections the newly-formed national party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), led by the President Binguwa Mutharika used its incumbent position to promote an economic policy based on food security in order to overcome traditional ethno-regional voting patterns and win a nationwide electoral majority. After presenting a formal model of a optimal allocation of an economic resource to overcome ethnic bias and induce vote-switching, we use district-level data in a system of equations to analyze if strategic allocation within the national fertilizer subsidy program contributed to the nation-wide electoral victory of the DPP.

Keywords: Malawi, Democratization, Ethnicity, Food Security, Elections

Suggested Citation

Brazys, Samuel Rueckert and Heaney, Peter and Walsh, Patrick Paul, From the Great Lakes to the Great Rift Valley: Does Strategic Economic Policy Explain the 2009 Malawi Election? (February 26, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2401600 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401600

Samuel Rueckert Brazys (Contact Author)

University College Dublin (UCD) - School of Politics and International Relations ( email )

Belfield
Dublin, 4
Ireland
+353-01-716-8387 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucd.ie/spire

Peter Heaney

Independent

Patrick Paul Walsh

UCD ( email )

University College Dublin
Belfield, Dublin Dublin 4
Ireland

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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