Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria: Improving Service Delivery in Core Sectors

In J. Isawa Elaigw (ed.) Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Facing the Challenges of the Future. Abuja, Adonis & Abbey Publishers. 2007.

19 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2014 Last revised: 24 Mar 2014

See all articles by Lev Freinkman

Lev Freinkman

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow); World Bank - The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

Date Written: April 26, 2007

Abstract

Nigeria’s model of fiscal federalism represents a fundamental legal and institutional framework for policymaking in the country. As in other federations, it defines the core rules for resource allocation, distribution of responsibilities for service delivery, and mechanisms for interaction between different tiers of government.

Nigeria’s fiscal federalism arrangements are currently attracting increasing attention from both policymakers and analysts. This is a reflection of the fact that longer term perspectives of economic policy reform in the country are critically dependent upon improvements in the organization of inter-governmental arrangements. Such arrangements have direct implications for achieving national growth and poverty reduction targets. Simply put, there is a major need to strengthen the incentives of government agencies at all levels of authority to improve cooperation in designing of their policies and delivery of services. At the same time, capacity will have to be built to support such future intergovernmental cooperation.

Keywords: Nigeria, Inter-governmental relations, service delivery

JEL Classification: H72, H77, H53

Suggested Citation

Freinkman, Lev, Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria: Improving Service Delivery in Core Sectors (April 26, 2007). In J. Isawa Elaigw (ed.) Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Facing the Challenges of the Future. Abuja, Adonis & Abbey Publishers. 2007. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2401715 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401715

Lev Freinkman (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

World Bank - The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) ( email )

Washington, DC 20433
United States

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