A New Perspective on Kesten's School Choice with Consent Idea

35 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2014 Last revised: 30 Nov 2017

See all articles by Qianfeng Tang

Qianfeng Tang

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics

Jingsheng Yu

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics

Date Written: July 9, 2014

Abstract

We revisit the school choice problem with consent proposed by Kesten (2010), which seeks to improve the efficiency of the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) by obtaining students’ consent to give up their priorities. We observe that for students to consent, we should use their consent only when their assignments are unimprovable. Inspired by this perspective, we propose a new algorithm that iteratively reruns DA after removing students who have been matched with underdemanded schools, together with their assignments. While this algorithm is outcome equivalent to Kesten’s EADAM, it is more accessible to practitioners due to its computational simplicity and transparency on consenting incentives. We also adapt this algorithm for school choice problems with weak priorities to simplify the stable improvement cycles algorithm proposed by Erdil and Ergin (2008).

Keywords: School choice, deferred acceptance algorithm, Pareto efficiency

JEL Classification: C78, D61, D78, I20

Suggested Citation

Tang, Qianfeng and Yu, Jingsheng, A New Perspective on Kesten's School Choice with Consent Idea (July 9, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402570 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2402570

Qianfeng Tang (Contact Author)

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

Jingsheng Yu

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

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