Financial Slack and Venture Managers' Decision to Seek a New Alliance

Posted: 20 Mar 2015

See all articles by Steven W. Bradley

Steven W. Bradley

Baylor University

Holger Patzelt

Max Planck Institute of Economics

Dean A. Shepherd

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Management & Entrepreneurship

David Deeds

Independent

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

We examine two distinct perspectives to analyze the role of financial slack in the decisions of technology venture managers to seek strategic alliances. According to the capabilities perspective, financial slack provides managers with the ability to maximize the benefits from acquiring missing capabilities through alliance formation, whereas according to the resource dependence perspective, financial slack buffers the managers' motivations to seek alliances as a reaction to external environmental scarcity. Drawing on an experimental design and data on 1632 decisions nested within 51 managers, we find support for a combined perspective demonstrating that managerial discretion in the form of financial slack moderates how internal capabilities and context encourage managers to seek alliances. We discuss implications of our work for the alliance literature.

Keywords: Strategic alliance; Decision; Capabilities; Slack; Environment

Suggested Citation

Bradley, Steven W. and Patzelt, Holger and Shepherd, Dean A. and Deeds, David, Financial Slack and Venture Managers' Decision to Seek a New Alliance (2008). Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 23, No. 4, 465-481, July 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402851

Steven W. Bradley (Contact Author)

Baylor University ( email )

PO Box 98011
Waco, TX 76798-8011
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://business.baylor.edu/directory/?id=Steve_Bradley

Holger Patzelt

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Str. 10
D-07745 Jena
Germany

Dean A. Shepherd

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Management & Entrepreneurship ( email )

Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-856-5220 (Phone)

David Deeds

Independent

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