Developments in the Legal Standing of Shareholders and Holding Corporations in Investor-State Dispute

26(1) ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, 2011, p. 34-75

43 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2014

See all articles by Martin Valasek

Martin Valasek

Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP

Patrick Dumberry

University of Ottawa - Civil Law Section

Date Written: March 3, 2010

Abstract

The focus of this paper is to systematically analyze the legal standing of shareholders before arbitral tribunals under modern investment treaties. We will examine the legal standing of different categories of shareholders, including “minority” and “indirect” shareholders, as well as the controversial issue of the standing of intermediate corporations (also generally known as “holding,” “shell” or “mailbox” corporations) through which international investments are often conducted. One particularly controversial issue to be addressed in this article is the distinction between cases of illegitimate and legitimate “treaty shopping.” Finally, we will examine some of the concerns that capital-importing States have raised as a result of these developments, including the issue of remoteness of claims by minority and indirect shareholders.

Keywords: shareholders, shell corporation, ICSID, investor-State arbitration, treaty shopping

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Valasek, Martin and Dumberry, Patrick, Developments in the Legal Standing of Shareholders and Holding Corporations in Investor-State Dispute (March 3, 2010). 26(1) ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, 2011, p. 34-75. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2404034

Martin Valasek

Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP

Suite 2500, 1 Place Ville Marie
Montreal, Quebec H3B 1R1
Canada

Patrick Dumberry (Contact Author)

University of Ottawa - Civil Law Section ( email )

57 Louis Pasteur Dr
Ottawa
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/index.php?option=com_contact&task=view&contact_id=148&Itemid=118

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