Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting

30 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2014

See all articles by Jan Boone

Jan Boone

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); TILEC

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE; Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER

S. Suetens

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 2014

Abstract

In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley [1991] and Segal and Whinston [2009b], we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it is cheaper for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting. We find that an incumbent who proposes contracts to buyers sequentially, excludes significantly more often than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously. In contrast to theory, this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive contract the higher the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.

Suggested Citation

Boone, Jan and Müller, Wieland and Suetens, S., Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting (March 2014). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 62, Issue 1, pp. 137-166, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2404133 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12045

Jan Boone (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2399 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

TILEC ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/w.mueller-3.htm

S. Suetens

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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