Facilitating the Commons Inside Out

18 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2014

See all articles by Hanoch Dagan

Hanoch Dagan

Berkeley Law School

Tsilly Dagan

University of Oxford, Faculty of Law; Bar Ilan University

Date Written: March 4, 2014

Abstract

Commons property is a true challenge to the law, especially in a legal context that respects individual mobility, which is key to freedom and autonomy. While a tragedy of the commons is not inevitable, the sustainability – let alone flourishing – of the commons is far from obvious either. But the rewards of the latter trajectory are critical: a successful commons property can generate significant economic benefits, due to its intrinsic advantages of economies of scale, risk-spreading, specialization, and synergy. These benefits multiply in the context of social commons property regimes that function as the loci and engines of meaningful interpersonal relationships; indeed, they at times even become constitutive elements of commoners’ identities. This Essay explores examples of governance mechanisms for the collective management of resources as well as tax tools for collective production that can support the success of these social commons property regimes. These legal devices, which set (respectively) the internal rules of the game and provide external incentives, both counter the potentially destructive dynamics of the commons property and help preserve the noncommodified aspects of its owners’ community.

Suggested Citation

Dagan, Hanoch and Dagan, Tsilly, Facilitating the Commons Inside Out (March 4, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2404519 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2404519

Hanoch Dagan (Contact Author)

Berkeley Law School ( email )

890 simon hall
215 Bancroft way
berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Tsilly Dagan

University of Oxford, Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Rd
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

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