Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries

34 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2014

See all articles by Michael Hoel

Michael Hoel

University of Oslo; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Aart de Zeeuw

Tilburg University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 20, 2014

Abstract

For sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development of new, climate friendly technologies that reduce the costs of abatement. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries of their willingness to pay for emission reductions. Increased willingness to pay for emissions reductions for any group of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in aggregate willingness to pay on equilibrium emissions is ambiguous.

Keywords: technology agreement, coalition stability, climate, international agreement

JEL Classification: F420, O320, Q200, C720

Suggested Citation

Hoel, Michael and de Zeeuw, Aart J., Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries (February 20, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4635, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2404897

Michael Hoel (Contact Author)

University of Oslo ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
+ 47 22 85 83 87 (Phone)
+ 47 22 85 50 35 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Aart J. De Zeeuw

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2065 (Phone)
+31-13-466-3042 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
360
PlumX Metrics