Codifying Chevmore

71 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2014 Last revised: 29 Sep 2015

See all articles by Kent H. Barnett

Kent H. Barnett

University of Georgia School of Law

Date Written: April 1, 2015


This article considers the significance and promise of Congress’s unprecedented codification of administrative law’s well-known Chevron and Skidmore judicial-deference doctrines (to which I refer collectively as “Chevmore”). Congress did so in the Dodd-Frank Act by instructing courts to apply the Skidmore deference factors when reviewing certain agency preemption decisions and by referring to Chevron throughout.

This codification is meaningful because it informs the delegation theory that undergirds Chevmore (i.e., that Congress intends either to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies or, at least, allow courts to defer to agency views when courts retain interpretive primacy). Scholars and at least three Supreme Court justices have decried the judicial inquiry into congressional intent as “fictional” or “fraudulent.” They argue that Congress doesn’t think about interpretive primacy, courts don’t really try to divine congressional intent, and courts use overbroad assumptions when deciphering congressional intent.

Dodd-Frank provides the best direct evidence to date that Chevmore is not a fiction. Dodd-Frank reveals that Congress knows of Chevmore, legislates with it in mind, and acquiesces to it. But Dodd-Frank’s preemption provisions — giving an agency rulemaking power but subjecting its decisions to Skidmore review — undermine the Supreme Court’s recent statement in City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013), that Congress intends agencies to receive interpretive primacy (via Chevron’s more deferential review) whenever they use rulemaking. These insights support the delegation theory and earlier precedents (like United States v. Mead) that did not treat rulemaking as a talisman. If courts apply these earlier precedents, Chevmore is neither fiction nor fraud.

Dodd-Frank also shows Chevmore codification’s promise for addressing longstanding administrative-law issues. With “Chevron rewards” and “Skidmore penalties,” Congress — as it did in Dodd-Frank — can clarify how agencies must act to obtain Chevron deference, balance “hard look” judicial review with regulatory ossification, and respond to regulatory capture. Chevmore codification thereby can become a key legislative tool for overseeing the administrative state.

Keywords: administrative law, Chevron, Skidmore, Chevmore, Mead, deference, judicial review, Administrative Procedure Act, delegation, interpretive primacy, statutory intrepretation, common law, hard look review, regulatory capture

Suggested Citation

Barnett, Kent Harris, Codifying Chevmore (April 1, 2015). 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2015), UGA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-12, Available at SSRN:

Kent Harris Barnett (Contact Author)

University of Georgia School of Law ( email )

225 Herty Drive
Athens, GA 30602
United States

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