A Model Human Rights Clause for the EU's International Trade Agreements

German Institute for Human Rights and Misereor, 2014

42 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2014 Last revised: 4 Jun 2014

See all articles by Lorand Bartels

Lorand Bartels

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Date Written: February 1, 2014

Abstract

This study was commissioned jointly by the German Institute for Human Rights and MISEREOR in order to consider the implications of these provisions in the Guiding Principles and to examine how they might be implemented in practice. The study examines the origins of the current human rights clause in EU trade and investment cooperation agreements and its limited scope, which is chiefly concerned with revoking trade preferences in countries where serious violations of human rights or breakdown of democratic governance principles occur. The study then goes on to examine ways in which it would be possible to revise the standard human rights clause to include negative consequences for human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights, as a result of the treaty itself. This is not a simple matter: The study acknowledges that documenting these types of human rights violations and attributing them to a trade or investment treaty is not easy. But even if it proves challenging in practice, the Lisbon Treaty obligates the European Union to protect human rights in its external activities as well, and that the EU and its member states have committed to implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

Keywords: international law, EU law, human rights, free trade agreements

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Bartels, Lorand, A Model Human Rights Clause for the EU's International Trade Agreements (February 1, 2014). German Institute for Human Rights and Misereor, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2405852

Lorand Bartels (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

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