Inter-Temporal Patterns of R&D Collaboration and Innovative Performance

27 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2014

See all articles by René Belderbos

René Belderbos

University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation; Maastricht University - Department of Organization & Strategy

Martin A. Carree

University of Maastricht - Department of Organization & Strategy

Boris Lokshin

Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics

Sastre Juan Fernández

Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) - Ecuador

Date Written: January 2014

Abstract

While prior studies have investigated the effect of collaborative R&D with different partner types (suppliers, customers, competitors and research institutions & universities) on firms’ innovative performance, the implications of dynamic patterns in these collaborations have not received attention. In a large panel of Spanish innovating firms operating in a broad range of industries during the period 2004-2011, we examine the differential effects of recently formed, persistent, and recently discontinued collaboration on innovative performance. Persistence is the most common pattern of collaboration, while discontinuities are most often observed for competitor collaboration. We find that it is persistent collaboration that has a systematically positive effect on performance. With the exception of recently formed collaboration with universities and research institutes, other temporal patterns of collaboration do not significantly improve performance. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: R&D collaboration, innovation, productivity

JEL Classification: O31, O32

Suggested Citation

Belderbos, Rene and Carree, Martin A. and Lokshin, Boris and Juan Fernández, Sastre, Inter-Temporal Patterns of R&D Collaboration and Innovative Performance (January 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2407399 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2407399

Rene Belderbos (Contact Author)

University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32 16 32 6912 (Phone)
+32 16 32 6732 (Fax)

Maastricht University - Department of Organization & Strategy ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Martin A. Carree

University of Maastricht - Department of Organization & Strategy ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Boris Lokshin

Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31 43 388 3697 (Phone)
+31 43 325 4893 (Fax)

Sastre Juan Fernández

Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) - Ecuador ( email )

La Pradera 7-174 y Diego de Almagro
Quito, Pichincha 000
Ecuador

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