A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players
12 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2014 Last revised: 17 Aug 2014
Date Written: November 19, 2013
Abstract
Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.
Keywords: Extensive games, Ambiguity, Maxmin
JEL Classification: C72, D81
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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