A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players

12 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2014 Last revised: 17 Aug 2014

See all articles by Gaurab Aryal

Gaurab Aryal

Washington University in St. Louis

Ronald Stauber

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Economics

Date Written: November 19, 2013

Abstract

Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

Keywords: Extensive games, Ambiguity, Maxmin

JEL Classification: C72, D81

Suggested Citation

Aryal, Gaurab and Stauber, Ronald, A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players (November 19, 2013). Economics Letters, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2408719 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2408719

Gaurab Aryal (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis ( email )

Seigle Hall 335
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

Ronald Stauber

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Economics ( email )

Canberra
Australia

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