Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality

51 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2014

See all articles by Gerard J. van den Berg

Gerard J. van den Berg

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Johan Vikström

Uppsala University; IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2014

Abstract

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part‐time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.

Keywords: Offer rejection, sanction, search effort, unemployment duration, wage

JEL Classification: C21, C41, D83, E65, H75, J30, J31, J44, J62, J64,

Suggested Citation

van den Berg, Gerard J. and Vikström, Johan, Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality (April 2014). The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, Issue 2, pp. 284-334, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2408833 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12051

Gerard J. Van den Berg (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Johan Vikström

Uppsala University ( email )

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation

Box 513
751 20 Uppsala
Sweden

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