Works Councils, Collective Bargaining, and Apprenticeship Training – Evidence from German Firms

24 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2014

See all articles by Ben Kriechel

Ben Kriechel

Economix München; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Maastricht University - Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA)

Samuel Muehlemann

University of Bern

Harald Pfeifer

Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB)

Miriam Schütte

University of Bonn

Date Written: April 2014

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training in Germany. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co‐determination rights to training‐related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost‐benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm‐level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training, we find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in training compared to firms without such an institution. We also find that the fraction of former trainees still employed with the same firm 5 years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, thus enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. Furthermore, all works council effects are much more pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining agreements.

Suggested Citation

Kriechel, Ben and Mühlemann, Samuel and Pfeifer, Harald and Schütte, Miriam, Works Councils, Collective Bargaining, and Apprenticeship Training – Evidence from German Firms (April 2014). Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp. 199-222, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2409369 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irel.12061

Ben Kriechel

Economix München ( email )

Lindwurmstr. 9
München, 80337
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.economix.org

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Maastricht University - Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA) ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, MD6200
Netherlands

Samuel Mühlemann

University of Bern ( email )

Gesellschaftstrasse 49
Bern, CH-3012
Switzerland

Harald Pfeifer

Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB) ( email )

Bonn
Germany

Miriam Schütte

University of Bonn ( email )

Regina-Pacis-Weg 3
Postfach 2220
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

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