32 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2014 Last revised: 12 Nov 2015
Date Written: November 11, 2015
We study the equilibrium of second-price auctions with resale when the value of the asset is subject to future state uncertainty. We assume bidders differ in their sensitivities toward each state, resulting in alternating orderings of use values. In both complete and incomplete information settings, equilibrium bids are higher than expected use values, equilibrium bidding functions are non-monotone and convex, with a minimum at the median of type distribution. Under incomplete information, the winner of the auction is unable to infer the type of losing bidder with certainty, which can result in scenarios where she cannot capture all surplus.
Keywords: Auctions, Resale, Uncertainty
JEL Classification: D44, D80, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Karahan, Mehmet Oğuz and Kuzubas, Tolga Umut, Second Price Auctions with Resale Under State Uncertainty (November 11, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2410762 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2410762