Intergovernmentalism and Its Limits: Assessing the European Union's Answer to the Euro Crisis

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 9, 2013, September (pp. 1003-29)

28 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2014

See all articles by Sergio Fabbrini

Sergio Fabbrini

Luiss University of Rome, Political Science Department

Date Written: March 20, 2014

Abstract

The Lisbon Treaty has institutionalized a dual constitution, supranational in the single market’s policies and intergovernmental in (among others) economic and financial policies. The extremely complex system of economic governance set up for answering the euro crisis has been defined and implemented on the basis of the intergovernmental constitution of the EU. The euro crisis has thus represented a test for the validity of the intergovernmental constitution of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the measures adopted in the period 2010-2012, consisting of legislative decisions and new intergovernmental treaties, are of an unprecedented magnitude, they were nevertheless unable to promote effective and legitimate solutions for dealing with the financial crisis. In the context of an existential challenge, the intergovernmental approach faced a structural difficulty in solving basic dilemmas of collective action.

Keywords: Lisbon Treaty, supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, euro crisis, treaty reform

Suggested Citation

Fabbrini, Sergio, Intergovernmentalism and Its Limits: Assessing the European Union's Answer to the Euro Crisis (March 20, 2014). Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 9, 2013, September (pp. 1003-29), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2411959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2411959

Sergio Fabbrini (Contact Author)

Luiss University of Rome, Political Science Department

Viale Romania 32
Rome, 00197
Italy

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