The Geography of Financial Misconduct

56 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2014 Last revised: 17 Jun 2018

See all articles by Christopher A. Parsons

Christopher A. Parsons

Foster School of Business, University of Washington

Johan Sulaeman

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Finance

Sheridan Titman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 29, 2016

Abstract

Financial misconduct (FM) rates differ widely between major U.S. cities, up to a factor of three. Although spatial differences in enforcement and firm characteristics do not account for these patterns, city-level norms appear to be very important. For example, FM rates are strongly related to other unethical behavior, involving politicians, doctors, and (potentially unfaithful) spouses, in the city.

Keywords: corporate corruption, financial misconduct, peer effects, political fraud, white collar misconduct

JEL Classification: G30, G34, R30

Suggested Citation

Parsons, Christopher A. and Sulaeman, Johan and Titman, Sheridan, The Geography of Financial Misconduct (June 29, 2016). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2412970 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2412970

Christopher A. Parsons

Foster School of Business, University of Washington ( email )

PACCAR HALL
4273 E Stevens Way NE
Seattle, WA 98195
United States

Johan Sulaeman (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Finance ( email )

Mochtar Riady Building
15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 119245
Singapore

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/johansulaeman/

Sheridan Titman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-232-2787 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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