Regulation of Network Sectors in the EU: A Federalist Perspective

Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter 61(1), 2014, pp. 181-194

14 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2014 Last revised: 2 May 2016

See all articles by Wolfgang Kerber

Wolfgang Kerber

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Julia Wendel

University of Marburg

Date Written: March 25, 2014

Abstract

The vertical allocation of regulatory powers within the European two-level system of network sector regulation is analysed from the perspective of the economic theory of legal federalism. The analysis shows that sophisticated combinations of harmonised European rules along with sufficient scope for decentralised decisions of national regulators seem to be optimal. Especially interesting is that networks of regulatory authorities (as BEREC in telecommunications) can play an important role in regard to balancing the advantages and disadvantages of (de)centralisation. Whereas in regard to telecommunication a further shifting of regulatory powers to the EU level cannot be recommended, both in energy and railway markets it might still be necessary to strengthen the regulatory power of the EU.

Keywords: EU sector regulation, legal federalism, regulatory networks, telecommunication

JEL Classification: K23, H77, F15

Suggested Citation

Kerber, Wolfgang and Wendel, Julia, Regulation of Network Sectors in the EU: A Federalist Perspective (March 25, 2014). Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter 61(1), 2014, pp. 181-194. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2414422

Wolfgang Kerber (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany
+49 6421 2823921 (Phone)

Julia Wendel

University of Marburg ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 24
D-35032 Marburg, D-35032
Germany

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