The Continuing Debate on Equity and Efficiency in the Law: A Counter-Response to Kaplow and Shavell (2000)

28 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2000 Last revised: 9 May 2008

See all articles by Chris William Sanchirico

Chris William Sanchirico

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

Date Written: July 2001

Abstract

Almost all Law and Economic analysis evaluates legal rules solely on the basis of the efficiency criterion with no consideration of distributive justice. Recently, the rationale for this long standing practice has been called into question by scholars within the Law and Economics community. In response, proponents of pure efficiency have offered new counterarguments in an attempt to shore up the consensus methodology. This comment critically evaluates these counterarguments. It finds that they mischaracterize and misconceive the recent criticisms of pure efficiency. Assessing the overall debate, the comment concludes that Law and Economics' exclusive focus on efficiency continues to lack justification even within the limited purview of modern economic reasoning. [Note: The current version of this paper is incorporated into Parts III and IV of Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003 (July 2001)]

Keywords: Optimal Taxation, Equity, Income Tax Only Results

JEL Classification: K00, K34, K13, H21, H23

Suggested Citation

Sanchirico, Chris William, The Continuing Debate on Equity and Efficiency in the Law: A Counter-Response to Kaplow and Shavell (2000) (July 2001). UVA Law School, Law-Economics Research Paper No. 00-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=241573 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.241573

Chris William Sanchirico (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4220 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csanchir/

University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

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