Are Taxes Beautiful? A Survey Experiment on Information, Tax Choice and Perceived Adequacy of the Tax Burden

34 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2014 Last revised: 19 Aug 2018

See all articles by Lorenzo Abbiati

Lorenzo Abbiati

University of Insubria

Armenak Antinyan

Wenlan School of Business; Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 26, 2014

Abstract

We report results from a survey experiment aimed at testing whether providing information on the national public expenditure to the taxpayers and whether involving them in the process of allocating tax revenues over public goods influence the level of the adequate tax rate - the fraction of income that individuals consider adequate to pay as taxes. We find that providing information on public expenditure does not influence the level of the adequate tax rate. On the contrary, the level of the adequate tax rate substantially increases when taxpayers can get to choose the public goods to finance through their taxation.

Keywords: Tax Choice, Adequate Tax Rate, Survey Experiment

JEL Classification: H24, H50, D31

Suggested Citation

Abbiati, Lorenzo and Antinyan, Armenak and Corazzini, Luca, Are Taxes Beautiful? A Survey Experiment on Information, Tax Choice and Perceived Adequacy of the Tax Burden (March 26, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2416147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2416147

Lorenzo Abbiati

University of Insubria ( email )

Via Ravasi 2
Varese, 21100 21100
Italy

Armenak Antinyan (Contact Author)

Wenlan School of Business ( email )

No.143, Wuluo Road
Wuhan, Hubei 430073
China

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School ( email )

Aberconway Building
Colum Drive
Cardiff, CF10 3EU
United Kingdom

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

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