Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining

40 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2014

See all articles by Syed Nageeb Ali

Syed Nageeb Ali

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics

B. Douglas Bernheim

Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Xiaochen Fan

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 2014

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the concentration of political power in legislative bargaining and the predictability of the process governing the recognition of legislators. Our main result establishes that, for a broad class of legislative bargaining games, if the recognition procedure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one round in advance, then irrespective of how patient the individual legislators are, Markovian equilibria necessarily deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer. We also examine the extent to which alternative bargaining protocols can limit the concentration of power.

Suggested Citation

Ali, Syed Nageeb and Bernheim, B. Douglas and Fan, Xiaochen, Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining (March 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2418126

Syed Nageeb Ali (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States

B. Douglas Bernheim

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-725-8732 (Phone)
650-725-5702 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Xiaochen Fan

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

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