Moneyball for State Regulators

Forthcoming National Affairs

23 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2014

See all articles by Edward L. Glaeser

Edward L. Glaeser

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Cass R. Sunstein

Harvard Law School; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: March 29, 2014

Abstract

For over thirty years, Republican and Democratic presidents have required executive agencies to assess the costs and benefits of significant regulations, and to proceed only if the benefits justify the costs (to the extent permitted by law). The goals of the resulting processes have been to constrain unjustified regulation, to promote interagency coordination, and to allow a degree of centralized management of what can be a cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus. Unfortunately, state and local governments sometimes impose costly requirements, undisciplined by careful analysis of their likely consequences. New institutions at the state level, producing such analysis, could be highly beneficial, replacing processes sometimes driven by anecdotes, dogmas, emotions, and interest-group pressures with a form of Regulatory Moneyball.

Keywords: cost-benefit analysis, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, state regulation, Regulatory Moneyball

Suggested Citation

Glaeser, Edward L. and Sunstein, Cass R., Moneyball for State Regulators (March 29, 2014). Forthcoming National Affairs, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2418306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2418306

Edward L. Glaeser

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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