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Judging Leaders Who Facilitate Crimes by a Foreign Army: International Courts Differ on a Novel Legal Issue

31 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2014 Last revised: 30 Nov 2014

Mugambi Jouet

Stanford Law School

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

In one of the most significant cases in the history of international criminal law, Prosecutor v. Perišić, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) effectively addressed an issue of first impression: may a military or political leader be convicted for knowingly facilitating crimes by another state’s army? The influential tribunal answered this question in the negative—knowledge that the recipients of military assistance are perpetrating crimes is essentially irrelevant absent evidence that the facilitator specifically intended that crimes occur. The ICTY Appeals Chamber thus acquitted Serbian General Momčilo Perišić, who had been convicted at trial of knowingly aiding and abetting atrocities by the Bosnian Serb army in Sarajevo and Srebrenica between 1993 and 1995.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone subsequently held that the controversial Perišić precedent did not comport with customary international law, and therefore affirmed the conviction of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian President, for knowingly assisting atrocities by rebel forces during the Sierra Leone Civil War. In an even more striking development, a different ICTY appellate panel thereafter reversed the Perišić legal standard on the ground that it neither comported with ICTY jurisprudence nor customary international law.

The article analyzes this historic turn of events and explores the appropriate legal standard to convict leaders who enable atrocities by a foreign army.

Keywords: War crimes, International criminal law, international courts, international customary law, international relations

Suggested Citation

Jouet, Mugambi, Judging Leaders Who Facilitate Crimes by a Foreign Army: International Courts Differ on a Novel Legal Issue (2014). Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 47 (2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2418413

Mugambi Jouet (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.stanford.edu/profile/mugambi-jouet

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