Executive Vetoes and Economic Reform Theory and Evidence from the History of American Labor Regulation

37 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2014 Last revised: 8 Apr 2014

See all articles by Kaj Thomsson

Kaj Thomsson

Maastricht University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 27, 2011

Abstract

I analyze the role of legislative institutions in policy change, particularly the role of the veto power of political executives. I study situations characterized by two key features: First, there is a status quo in place that is considered undesirable by all major legislative players. Secondly, there is variation in the political institutions, in particular the strength of the veto power of the executive, and this matters for the ability of groups with different ideal outcomes to reach a compromise. I fi…rst show theoretically that endowing a political executive (here a governor) with veto power may facilitate policy change. I then use state-level variation in the enactment of workers’ compensation laws in the US to empirically examine the model’s predictions. The empirical results support the prediction that a strong executive veto, in this setting, facilitates policy change.

Keywords: legislative institutions, political economy, veto power, economic reform

JEL Classification: D72, N42, K31, J88

Suggested Citation

Thomsson, Kaj, Executive Vetoes and Economic Reform Theory and Evidence from the History of American Labor Regulation (October 27, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2419922 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2419922

Kaj Thomsson (Contact Author)

Maastricht University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
10
Abstract Views
974
PlumX Metrics