Knighthoods, Damehoods, and CEO Behaviour

Konrad Raff

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)

Linus Siming

Audencia Business School

September 27, 2016

Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming

We study whether and how politicians can influence the behaviour of CEOs and firm performance with prestigious government awards. We present a simple model to develop the hypothesis that government awards have a negative effect on firm performance. The empirical analysis uses two legal reforms in New Zealand for identification: Knighthoods and damehoods were abolished in April 2000 but reinstated in March 2009. The findings are consistent with the predictions of the model. The results suggest that government awards serve as an incentive tool through which politicians influence firms in favour of employees to the detriment of shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Awards, CEO Incentives, Employment, Stakeholder-oriented Firms

JEL Classification: G38, J33, J38

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Date posted: April 5, 2014 ; Last revised: October 21, 2016

Suggested Citation

Raff, Konrad and Siming, Linus, Knighthoods, Damehoods, and CEO Behaviour (September 27, 2016). Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2420066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2420066

Contact Information

Konrad Raff
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) ( email )
Department of Finance
Helleveien 30
Bergen, 5045
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/raffkonrad/
Linus Siming (Contact Author)
Audencia Business School
8 route de la Jonelière, BP 31222
Nantes Cedex 3, Cedex 3 44312
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