Knighthoods, Damehoods, and CEO Behaviour

53 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2014 Last revised: 27 Feb 2018

See all articles by Konrad Raff

Konrad Raff

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)

Linus Siming

Audencia Business School

Date Written: September 27, 2016


We study whether and how politicians can influence the behaviour of CEOs and firm performance with prestigious government awards. We present a simple model to develop the hypothesis that government awards have a negative effect on firm performance. The empirical analysis uses two legal reforms in New Zealand for identification: Knighthoods and damehoods were abolished in April 2000 but reinstated in March 2009. The findings are consistent with the predictions of the model. The results suggest that government awards serve as an incentive tool through which politicians influence firms in favour of employees to the detriment of shareholders.

Keywords: Awards, CEO Incentives, Employment, Stakeholder-oriented Firms

JEL Classification: G38, J33, J38

Suggested Citation

Raff, Konrad and Siming, Linus, Knighthoods, Damehoods, and CEO Behaviour (September 27, 2016). Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: or

Konrad Raff

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) ( email )

Department of Finance
Helleveien 30
Bergen, 5045


Linus Siming (Contact Author)

Audencia Business School ( email )

8 route de la Jonelière, BP 31222
Nantes Cedex 3, Cedex 3 44312

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