Reregulation and the Regulatory Timeline

Peter Molk

Willamette University - College of Law

Arden Rowell

University of Illinois College of Law; Harvard Law School

March 16, 2016

Iowa Law Review, Vol. 101 (2016)

Regulation is often casually conceived of as functioning like a binary on/off switch: as if an area, issue, or industry is either regulated or not. While this binary model of regulation can be useful, it also decontextualizes regulatory decisions from their position in time, and thus obscures important ways in which regulators are constrained and incentivized by past and future decisions. As an alternative, we present a timeline approach to regulation. The timeline approach is particularly helpful in illustrating the ways that earlier regulatory decisions create vestigial effects for later related decisions, and for highlighting the informational advantage that later regulators have over regulators earlier in the timeline. These temporally contextualized qualities are especially important under conditions of reregulation, which arise when a previously deregulated issue is regulated once again. Applying insights from financial option theory, we show how lessons from the timeline approach can be used to enhance regulatory decision-making at all stages on the timeline.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: regulation, deregulation, regulatory analysis, timeline, path dependency, intertemporal dependence, time orientation, regulation over time

JEL Classification: K40, K49, K20, K21, K23, K29, K32, K39, K00

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Date posted: April 5, 2014 ; Last revised: June 17, 2016

Suggested Citation

Molk, Peter and Rowell, Arden, Reregulation and the Regulatory Timeline (March 16, 2016). Iowa Law Review, Vol. 101 (2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2420289 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2420289

Contact Information

Peter Molk (Contact Author)
Willamette University - College of Law ( email )
245 Winter St. SE
Salem, OR 97301
United States
Arden Rowell
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

Harvard Law School
1557 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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