Shortchanging Justice: The Arbitrary Relationship between Refugee System Reform and Federal Legal Aid Funding

“Shortchanging Justice: The Arbitrary Relationship between Refugee System Reform and Federal Legal Aid Funding” (2014) 91:3 Canadian Bar Review 583.

Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2014-24

55 Pages Posted: 10 Apr 2014 Last revised: 4 Oct 2014

See all articles by Jennifer Bond

Jennifer Bond

University of Ottawa - Common Law Section

David Wiseman

University of Ottawa - Common Law Section

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

Canada’s system for processing refugee claims changed significantly in 2012 when the federal government implemented wide-ranging reforms. This article examines the extent to which the link between these reforms and the legal needs of refugee claimants were considered as part of either the legislative process or the intergovernmental legal aid funding agreements process. It concludes that no meaningful consideration occurred in either and that this renders the legal aid funding model arbitrary. This arbitrary approach is then situated in a historical context and shown to be the culmination of a federal refugee policy trajectory that is increasingly shortchanging access to justice for refugees.

Keywords: Refugees, Access to Justice, Legal Aid

Suggested Citation

Bond, Jennifer and Wiseman, David, Shortchanging Justice: The Arbitrary Relationship between Refugee System Reform and Federal Legal Aid Funding (2014). “Shortchanging Justice: The Arbitrary Relationship between Refugee System Reform and Federal Legal Aid Funding” (2014) 91:3 Canadian Bar Review 583. ; Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2014-24. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2422855

Jennifer Bond (Contact Author)

University of Ottawa - Common Law Section ( email )

57 Louis Pasteur Street
Ottawa, K1N 6N5
Canada

David Wiseman

University of Ottawa - Common Law Section ( email )

57 Louis Pasteur Street
Ottawa, K1N 6N5
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/index.php

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