Hotelling Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
61 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2014 Last revised: 25 Jan 2016
Date Written: January 18, 2016
We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost bore by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We perform this comparison in term of the induced price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the worst equilibrium cost and the optimal cost, and the induced price of stability, i.e., the ratio of the best equilibrium cost and the optimal cost. We show that, asymptotically in the number of retailers, these ratios are two and one, respectively.
Keywords: induced price of anarchy, induced price of stability, location games on networks, pure equilibria, large games, utility games.
JEL Classification: C72, R30, R39
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation