Entry and Competition in Takeover Auctions

47 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2014 Last revised: 10 May 2018

See all articles by Matthew L. Gentry

Matthew L. Gentry

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics

Caleb Stroup

Davidson College

Date Written: February 6, 2018

Abstract

We estimate the degree of uncertainty faced by potential bidders in takeover auctions and quantify how it affects prices in auctions and negotiations. The high degree of uncertainty revealed by our structural estimation encourages entry in auctions but reduces a target's bargaining power in negotiations. In the aggregate, auctions and negotiations produce similar prices, even though auctions are preferred in takeover markets with high uncertainty, while the reverse is true for negotiations. Firm characteristics predict pre-entry uncertainty and thus are informative about the relative performance of auctions and negotiations for individual targets.

Keywords: Takeover Auctions, Mergers and Acquisitions, Information Frictions

JEL Classification: G34, D44, C7, D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Gentry, Matthew L. and Stroup, Caleb, Entry and Competition in Takeover Auctions (February 6, 2018). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2423575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2423575

Matthew L. Gentry

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 020 7955 6213 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/gentry_matthew/

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