Stability and Identification with Optimal Macroprudential Policy Rules

18 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2014

See all articles by Jean-Bernard Chatelain

Jean-Bernard Chatelain

Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne

Kirsten Ralf

Ecole Supérieure du Commerce Extérieur (ESCE)

Date Written: April 13, 2014

Abstract

This paper investigates the identification, the determinacy and the stability of ad hoc, "quasi-optimal" and optimal policy rules augmented with financial stability indicators (such as asset prices deviations from their fundamental values) and minimizing the volatility of the policy interest rates, when the central bank precommits to financial stability. Firstly, ad hoc and quasi-optimal rules parameters of financial stability indicators cannot be identified. For those rules, non zero policy rule parameters of financial stability indicators are observationally equivalent to rule parameters set to zero in another rule, so that they are unable to inform monetary policy. Secondly, under controllability conditions, optimal policy rules parameters of financial stability indicators can all be identified, along with a bounded solution stabilizing an unstable economy as in Woodford (2003), with determinacy of the initial conditions of non- predetermined variables.

Keywords: Identification, Financial Stability, Optimal Policy under Commitment, Augmented Taylor rule, Monetary Policy.

JEL Classification: C61, C62, E43, E44, E47, E52, E58

Suggested Citation

Chatelain, Jean-Bernard and Ralf, Kirsten, Stability and Identification with Optimal Macroprudential Policy Rules (April 13, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2424208 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2424208

Jean-Bernard Chatelain (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/chatelain-jean-bernard/

Kirsten Ralf

Ecole Supérieure du Commerce Extérieur (ESCE) ( email )

10 Rue Sextius Michel
Paris, 75015
France

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