Non-Practicing Entities: Enforcement Specialists?

36 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2014 Last revised: 21 May 2016

Axel Haus

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Steffen Juranek

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science

Date Written: May 20, 2016

Abstract

We examine whether non-practicing entities (NPEs) have a superior ability to pursue patent lawsuits. Comparative advantages in patent enforcement allow vertical specialization on licensing, and serve as a source for gains from trade on the market for patents, especially for patents sold by small innovators. Our theoretical model predicts that cases with better abled patentees resolve faster than cases with opponents of equal ability. Our empirical analysis of a sample of US patent litigation cases shows this duration pattern for NPE cases. We observe the same duration pattern for large firm patentees; firms with access to a similar legal expertise.

Keywords: non-practicing entities, litigation, patents, innovation

JEL Classification: K0, K41, O34

Suggested Citation

Haus, Axel and Juranek, Steffen, Non-Practicing Entities: Enforcement Specialists? (May 20, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2424407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2424407

Axel Haus

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Grueneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.mm.uni-frankfurt.de/index.php?id=1522?&L=1

Steffen Juranek (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

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