Campaign Finance in U.S. House Elections

57 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2014

See all articles by Kei Kawai

Kei Kawai

University of California at Berkeley

Date Written: April 13, 2014

Abstract

This paper structurally estimates a dynamic model of fund-raising, campaign spending, and accumulation of war chest with unobserved candidate quality. We present an identification strategy similar to the one developed in the context of production function estimation that allows us to recover the quality (vote-getting ability) of the candidates. In our counterfactual experiment, we consider the equilibrium effects of government subsidies to challengers. We find that the subsidies substantially crowd out the challenger's fund-raising and increase the incumbent's fund-raising. Analysis that ignores these equilibrium effects substantially overestimates the effect of the policy.

Suggested Citation

Kawai, Kei, Campaign Finance in U.S. House Elections (April 13, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2424542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2424542

Kei Kawai (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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