Individual Choices in Dynamic Networks: An Experiment on Social Preferences

PLOS ONE 9(4): e92276. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276, April 2014

16 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2014

See all articles by Dennie van Dolder

Dennie van Dolder

University of Essex - Department of Economics

Vincent Buskens

Utrecht University - Department of Sociology/ICS; Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Date Written: April 14, 2014

Abstract

Game-theoretic models of network formation typically assume that people create relations so as to maximize their own outcome in the network. Recent experiments on network formation suggest that the assumption of self-interest might be unwarranted and that social preferences, such as altruism and inequality aversion, play a role in the formation of social networks. We developed an experiment to systematically investigate whether people show preferences for outcomes of others during network formation. We find that such preferences play a role when network decisions degenerate to simple two-person decision tasks. In more complex environments, however, we find little evidence for social preferences as a significant decision criterion. Furthermore, we find some evidence for farsighted behavior in network formation.

Keywords: Social Networks; Network Formation; Game Theory; Experimental Sociology; Network Experiment; Social Preferences; Inequality aversion; Altruism; Farsightedness

JEL Classification: C92

Suggested Citation

van Dolder, Dennie and Buskens, Vincent and Buskens, Vincent, Individual Choices in Dynamic Networks: An Experiment on Social Preferences (April 14, 2014). PLOS ONE 9(4): e92276. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276, April 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2425175

Dennie Van Dolder (Contact Author)

University of Essex - Department of Economics ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Vincent Buskens

Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Rotterdam
Netherlands

Utrecht University - Department of Sociology/ICS ( email )

Heidelberglaan 2
Utrecht, 3584 CS
Netherlands

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