Party Polarization, Political Alignment, and Federal Grant Spending at the State Level

41 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2014 Last revised: 3 Sep 2017

See all articles by William Hankins

William Hankins

Jacksonville State University, Alabama

Gary A. Hoover

University of Oklahoma

Paul Pecorino

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

Date Written: September 2, 2017

Abstract

Research on the distribution of federal expenditures has provided mixed evidence showing that states with more legislators who belong to the president's party and states with more legislators in the chamber majority tend to receive a larger allocation of federal funds. We add to this research by considering how political polarization and political alignment impact these presidential and congressional determinants of how the domestic US budget is distributed to the states. Our results show that states with a larger percentage of senators in the majority can secure a larger share of federal grant expenditures per capita when political polarization is relatively low.

Keywords: Federal Spending, Majoritarian, Political Alignment, Political Polarization

JEL Classification: H10, H50, H61, H77

Suggested Citation

Hankins, William and Hoover, Gary A. and Pecorino, Paul, Party Polarization, Political Alignment, and Federal Grant Spending at the State Level (September 2, 2017). Economics of Governance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427299

William Hankins (Contact Author)

Jacksonville State University, Alabama ( email )

700 Pelham Rd N
Jacksonville, AL 36265
United States

Gary A. Hoover

University of Oklahoma ( email )

308 Cate Center Drive
Room 170
Norman, OK 73072-2103
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/garyhoovereconomics/economics-622

Paul Pecorino

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
205-348-0379 (Phone)
205-348-0590 (Fax)

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