Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes

Pp. 1-20 in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, edited by Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser (Cambridge University Press, 2014)

U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 468

35 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2014 Last revised: 28 Apr 2014

Date Written: April 22, 2014

Abstract

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes are often denigrated as meaningless exercises in political theater. Yet the burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes more broadly has produced a wealth of insights into particular institutions such as legislatures, courts and elections; into regime practices such as co-optation and repression; and into non-democratic sources of accountability. In this vein, this introduction to a new edited volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government. The chapters in the book utilize a wide range of methods and focus on a broad set of cases, representing many different types of authoritarian regimes. The book offers an exploration into the constitutions of authoritarian regimes, generating broader insights into the study of constitutions and their functions more generally.

Suggested Citation

Ginsburg, Tom and Simpser, Alberto, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (April 22, 2014). Pp. 1-20 in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, edited by Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser (Cambridge University Press, 2014); U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 468. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427794 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427794

Tom Ginsburg (Contact Author)

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Alberto Simpser

ITAM ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Mexico City, CDMX 01080
Mexico
+525556284000 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.albertosimpser.com

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