Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Theory: Firm Profitability, Industry Regulation, and Board Tasks Performance

44 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2014

See all articles by Amedeo Pugliese

Amedeo Pugliese

University of Padova - Department of Economics and Management; QUT Business School

Alessandro Minichilli

Bocconi University - School of Management; Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology

Alessandro Zattoni

University of Bocconi - Strategic and Entrepreneurial Management

Date Written: April 1, 2013

Abstract

This study explores board tasks performance. Boards of directors fulfil two main tasks: (i) monitoring managers and firm performance, and (ii) providing advice and access to resources. A growing stream of research endeavours to understand what enhances (constrains) boards’ engagement into monitoring and advice tasks. This study seeks to increase our current knowledge into ways: first by looking at monitoring and advice concurrently – rather than in isolation – and, second by analysing how firm profitability and industry regulation affect board tasks performance. We rely upon survey and archival data from a sample of 264 Italian firms. Results show that: (i) highly performing firms are associated with lower levels of boards’ engagement into monitoring or advice tasks, and (ii) highly regulated industry increases board tasks performance.

Suggested Citation

Pugliese, Amedeo and Minichilli, Alessandro and Zattoni, Alessandro, Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Theory: Firm Profitability, Industry Regulation, and Board Tasks Performance (April 1, 2013). Journal of Business Research, Vol. 67, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2428086

Amedeo Pugliese (Contact Author)

University of Padova - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Via del Santo, 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

QUT Business School ( email )

2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4000
Australia

Alessandro Minichilli

Bocconi University - School of Management ( email )

Via Bocconi 8
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - Department of Management and Technology ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Alessandro Zattoni

University of Bocconi - Strategic and Entrepreneurial Management ( email )

Via Bocconi 8
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

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