Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game: How Common Fate, Proximity, and Similarity Affect Intergroup Competition

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120, 168-180, 2013

48 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2014 Last revised: 26 Jun 2014

See all articles by Chester Insko

Chester Insko

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Tim Wildschut

University of Southampton

Taya R. Cohen

Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Date Written: July 7, 2012

Abstract

In two experiments with the PDG we manipulated the Campbell (1958), or Wertheimer (1923), indices of entitativity (common fate, proximity, and similarity) to examine when a set of individuals interacts with another set of individuals in the competitive manner that is characteristic of group-on-group interactions. Experiment 1 found that interactions between two 3-person sets were more competitive when participants within each set shared (versus did not share) common fate. In Experiment 2, the Wertheimer-Campbell indices were manipulated for one 3-person set only (targets). Participants in the other 3-person set were sequestered in separate rooms (observers). Observers as well as targets were more competitive when targets shared (versus did not share) common fate. Path analyses in both experiments supported the idea that common fate increases competition via increased own-set entitativity and subsequent greed, and via increased other-set entitativity and subsequent fear. We found no consistent evidence for the possible roles of proximity and similarity.

Keywords: Entitativity, Intergroup relations, Prisoner’s dilemma game, Competition, Cooperation, Trust, Discontinuity Effect

Suggested Citation

Insko, Chester and Wildschut, Tim and Cohen, Taya R., Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game: How Common Fate, Proximity, and Similarity Affect Intergroup Competition (July 7, 2012). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120, 168-180, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2428574

Chester Insko

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

Tim Wildschut

University of Southampton ( email )

University Rd.
Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hampshire SO17 1LP
United Kingdom

Taya R. Cohen (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
4122686677 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tepper.cmu.edu/our-faculty-and-research/about-our-faculty/faculty-profiles/tcohen/cohen-t

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