Sequential Agenda Setting with Strategic and Informative Voting
47 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2014 Last revised: 13 Apr 2020
Date Written: April 12, 2020
We analyze a two-period collective bargaining game with asymmetric information and a persistent agenda setter. Voters have private information about their preferences over one-dimensional policy. The setter has a chance to alter the proposal if the initial one fails. When the revised proposal fails, the status-quo policy is implemented. We identify a difficulty of establishing an informative equilibrium, where voters use a cut-point strategy and partially reveal their preferences in the initial voting: a voter who dislikes reform may pretend to support the initial proposal so as to induce a more greedy proposal, which is more likely to fail. However, we show that the agenda-setting power makes the potential sabotage incentive dominated. Hence, an informative equilibrium exists, where the revised proposal is more compromising when the initial one receives more negative votes. The model demonstrates the effect of the agenda-setting power on extracting information in a dynamic and collective-decision environment.
Keywords: agenda setting, signaling, strategic voting
JEL Classification: C78, D72, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation