European Journal of International Law, 2015, Forthcoming
24 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2014 Last revised: 4 Jun 2014
Date Written: April 25, 2014
This Article uses an ongoing trade controversy litigated in U.S. courts and the World Trade Organization dispute resolution system as a vehicle for exploring different models to deal with parallel adjudications in different legal systems between the same or related parties on the same issue. In lieu of more traditional models of subordination or first-to-decide sequencing, the Article proposes an engagement model as a solution to the double courts, single issue problem.
Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, international law, U.S., Europe, legal systems, engagement model, double courts, double remedies
JEL Classification: K30, K33, K39
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cho, Sungjoon and Lee, Thomas H., Double Remedies in Double Courts (April 25, 2014). European Journal of International Law, 2015, Forthcoming; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2429410; Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper No. 2014-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2429410