Double Remedies in Double Courts

24 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2014 Last revised: 4 Jun 2014

Sungjoon Cho

Chicago Kent College of Law

Thomas H. Lee

Fordham University School of Law

Date Written: April 25, 2014

Abstract

This Article uses an ongoing trade controversy litigated in U.S. courts and the World Trade Organization dispute resolution system as a vehicle for exploring different models to deal with parallel adjudications in different legal systems between the same or related parties on the same issue. In lieu of more traditional models of subordination or first-to-decide sequencing, the Article proposes an engagement model as a solution to the double courts, single issue problem.

Keywords: WTO, World Trade Organization, international law, U.S., Europe, legal systems, engagement model, double courts, double remedies

JEL Classification: K30, K33, K39

Suggested Citation

Cho, Sungjoon and Lee, Thomas H., Double Remedies in Double Courts (April 25, 2014). European Journal of International Law, 2015, Forthcoming; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2429410; Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper No. 2014-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2429410

Sungjoon Cho

Chicago Kent College of Law ( email )

565 W. Adams St.
Chicago, IL 60661-3691
United States

Thomas H. Lee (Contact Author)

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

150 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
212.636.6728 (Phone)

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