The Evolution of Bank Boards of Directors in New York, 1840-1950

50 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2014 Last revised: 13 May 2021

See all articles by Howard Bodenhorn

Howard Bodenhorn

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); John E. Walker Department of Economics, Clemson University

Eugene N. White

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Date Written: April 2014

Abstract

Contemporary bank governance is criticized for manager-dominated (insider) boards of directors, but from the beginning of the nineteenth century, bank presidents appear also to have operated as chairmen of the boards of directors. However, the managers were constrained by a variety of rules that tended to align the interests of management, shareholders and other stakeholders until the mid-twentieth century. We trace this development through New York banking law and new data on banks chartered by the State of New York.

Suggested Citation

Bodenhorn, Howard and White, Eugene N., The Evolution of Bank Boards of Directors in New York, 1840-1950 (April 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20078, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2430072

Howard Bodenhorn (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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John E. Walker Department of Economics, Clemson University ( email )

Clemson, SC 29631
United States

Eugene N. White

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey ( email )

311 North 5th Street
New Brunswick, NJ 08854
United States

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