Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Audit Perceptions

33 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2014 Last revised: 22 Jul 2014

Date Written: April 28, 2014

Abstract

This paper derives a government's optimal tax audit policy when taxpayers hold different beliefs about the likelihood of a tax audit. When audits are inexpensive, differences in perceived audit risk lead to stricter optimal auditing in equilibrium. If audits are relatively costly, heterogeneity in audit perceptions lowers the equilibrium audit intensity. Except when beliefs are near-identical throughout the population, both tax evasion and honest reporting occur in equilibrium. A welfare analysis shows a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between perception heterogeneity and social welfare. High levels of social welfare are associated with very homogeneous or very heterogeneous populations. Moderately heterogeneous taxpayer populations are associated with lower levels of social welfare.

Keywords: Optimal Auditing, Heterogeneity, Tax Evasion

JEL Classification: D82, H26

Suggested Citation

Meyer-Brauns, Philipp, Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Audit Perceptions (April 28, 2014). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2014-06 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2430241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430241

Philipp Meyer-Brauns (Contact Author)

Dimensional Fund Advisors ( email )

6300 Bee Cave Road, Building One
Austin, TX 78746
United States

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