From Patent Thickets to Patent Networks: The Legal Infrastructure of the Digital Economy

55 Pages Posted: 3 May 2014 Last revised: 28 Aug 2014

Jonathan Barnett

USC Gould School of Law

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Date Written: August 18, 2014

Abstract

Scholarly and popular commentary often assert that markets characterized by intensive patent issuance and enforcement suffer from “patent thickets” that suppress innovation. This assertion is difficult to reconcile with continuous robust levels of R&D investment, coupled with declining prices, in technology markets that have operated under intensive patent issuance and enforcement for several decades. Using network visualization software, I show that information and communication technology markets rely on patent pools and other cross-licensing structures to mitigate or avoid patent thickets and associated inefficiencies. Based on the composition, structure, terms and pricing of selected leading patent pools in the ICT market, I argue that those pools are best understood as mechanisms by which vertically integrated firms mitigate transactional frictions and reduce the cost of accessing technology inputs. Appropriately structured patent pools can yield cost savings for intermediate users, which may translate into reduced prices for end-users, but at the risk of undercompensating R&D suppliers.

Suggested Citation

Barnett, Jonathan, From Patent Thickets to Patent Networks: The Legal Infrastructure of the Digital Economy (August 18, 2014). Jurimetrics, 2014; USC CLASS Research Paper No. CLASS14-22; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 14-23. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2431917

Jonathan Barnett (Contact Author)

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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