Why Does Anyone Mediate If Mediation Risks Psychological Dissatisfaction, Extra Costs and Manipulation? Three Theories Reveal Paradoxes Resolved by Mediator Standards of Ethical Practice

29 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution (2014), Forthcoming

25 Pages Posted: 5 May 2014

See all articles by Samuel Imperati

Samuel Imperati

Institute for Conflict Management

Steven Maser

Willamette University - Atkinson Graduate School of Management

Date Written: May 4, 2014

Abstract

Three paradoxes afflict mediation. First, if self-determination is a psychological need motivating the parties and the mediator, how can the parties and the mediator jointly satisfy their potentially conflicting needs? Second, if parties are having difficulty resolving their conflicting individual interests and incurring costs in the process, why would they invite a third party into the conflict who has his or her own interests and adds costs? Third, if it is impossible to guarantee that any collaborative decision making process can be immune to manipulation by one of the participants, including the mediator, why would parties expose themselves to the risks of mediation? Three mutually reinforcing theories (Self-Determination Theory, Transaction Resource Theory, and Collective Choice Theory) reveal these paradoxes. The analysis demonstrates how professional organizations and states can resolve the three paradoxes by crafting and enforcing mandatory standards of ethical practice for mediators.

Keywords: mediation, ethical code of conduct, self-determination theory, transaction resource theory, Arrow Paradox, rhetoric, behavioral economics, heresthetics

JEL Classification: C71, D71, D74, J52, J58

Suggested Citation

Imperati, Samuel and Maser, Steven M., Why Does Anyone Mediate If Mediation Risks Psychological Dissatisfaction, Extra Costs and Manipulation? Three Theories Reveal Paradoxes Resolved by Mediator Standards of Ethical Practice (May 4, 2014). 29 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution (2014), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2432697

Samuel Imperati

Institute for Conflict Management ( email )

Portland, OR
United States

Steven M. Maser (Contact Author)

Willamette University - Atkinson Graduate School of Management ( email )

900 State Street
Salem, OR 97301
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
96
Abstract Views
481
rank
296,446
PlumX Metrics