Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications

M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart, 2014)

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 30/2014

24 Pages Posted: 8 May 2014

See all articles by Paul P. Craig

Paul P. Craig

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

Date Written: May 5, 2014

Abstract

The financial crisis, and resulting crisis with the Euro, has had profound effects on the EU, and its Member States, even those that do not form part of the Euro zone. It has generated a welter of measures to combat the ‘problem’ and this flurry of initiatives has not yet come to an end, nor is it likely to do so in the short term. This chapter considers the emerging constitutional architecture resulting from these measures, from both a substantive and a formal dimension. This is followed by examination of the constitutional implications of the measures adopted thus far. The discussion considers these implications from a legal, economic and political perspective, and it will be seen that there are significant constitutional challenges in all three areas.

Keywords: financial crisis, euro crisis, legitimacy, oversight, assistance

Suggested Citation

Craig, Paul P., Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications (May 5, 2014). M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart, 2014) ; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 30/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2433071 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2433071

Paul P. Craig (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

St. Cross Building
St. Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UJ
United Kingdom

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