Punishing Collective Entities

Journal of Law and Policy, Forthcoming

29 Pages Posted: 5 May 2014 Last revised: 26 Apr 2015

See all articles by Tom Tyler

Tom Tyler

Yale University - Law School

Avital Mentovich

University of Haifa; University of Haifa, School of Criminology

Date Written: May 5, 2014

Abstract

This paper argues that, while the legal world treats corporate entities as “people” for legal purposes, this legal framing does not fit well with naïve models of assessing responsibility and blame. These difficulties raise questions about the value of treating entities as “people” for legal purposes just at a time when the United States Supreme Court seems to be moving actively to increase this “entity as a person” legal metaphor. The paper first reviews the literature on the psychology of responsibility and then presents both survey and experimental data that compare reactions to individual and organizational level wrongdoing. We argue that the data suggest that people have greater trouble holding entities responsible for wrongdoing and punishing them than they do making judgments of responsibility and endorsing punitive actions for individuals. In an era of corporate scandal and wrongdoing, this difficulty points to a problem within the law — the process of punishing corporate misconduct is more problematic than the process of punishing individual misconduct.

Keywords: Punishment, Collevtive Entities, Procedural Justice

Suggested Citation

Tyler, Tom and Mentovich, Avital and Mentovich, Avital, Punishing Collective Entities (May 5, 2014). Journal of Law and Policy, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2433168 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2433168

Tom Tyler

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

Avital Mentovich (Contact Author)

University of Haifa, School of Criminology ( email )

Mount Carmel
Haifa, 31905
Israel

University of Haifa ( email )

Mount Carmel
Haifa, 31905
Israel

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