Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime

David Michael Jaros

University of Baltimore - School of Law

March 1, 2013

Iowa Law Review, Vol. 99, p. 1473, 2014
University of Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-02

Bipartisanship can be dangerous. In the late 1970s, liberal and conservative forces united to discard two centuries of federal sentencing practice and usher in an era of fixed guidelines that would reshape the criminal justice landscape. In the decades that followed, liberals would come to bitterly regret their alliance with conservative sentencing reformers. The guideline regime established by the Sentencing Reform Act ultimately advanced hardline conservative criminal justice goals that were antithetical to the objectives of many of the Act’s former liberal supporters.

Researchers have shown that a particular cognitive bias — cultural cognition — can explain why intense partisan conflicts persist even when the sides share the same long-term goals. But while scholars have documented ways that cultural cognition fosters disagreement where parties may agree on desired outcomes, no commentator has explored the opposite phenomenon: whether cultural cognition may foster agreement where, in fact, citizens and policymakers sharply disagree.

This Article argues that the same cultural biases that foment conflict among parties who share similar goals may also mask substantive differences among parties that should never have collaborated in the first place. Using the reform effort that led to the federal sentencing guidelines and the current movement to establish criminal “problem-solving courts,” this Article demonstrates how, in some cases, cultural cognition may dangerously frustrate the goals of elected officials who broadly delegate power to politically unaccountable actors.

Accordingly, I recommend safeguards from administrative law that can minimize the dangers of flawed coalitions and promote deliberative democracy. By adopting sunset provisions and third-party monitors, policy makers can ensure that they do not overly commit to reform policies that will one day undermine their own interests.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: cultural cognition, sentencing, problem-solving courts, sentencing guidelines, deliberative democracy, sunset provisions, cognitive bias

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Date posted: May 9, 2014 ; Last revised: May 20, 2015

Suggested Citation

Jaros, David Michael, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime (March 1, 2013). Iowa Law Review, Vol. 99, p. 1473, 2014; University of Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2434058

Contact Information

David Michael Jaros (Contact Author)
University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )
1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States
HOME PAGE: http://law.ubalt.edu/
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